Abstract: When drafting the Constitution, the Framers implemented a structural system of checks and balances to guard against the executive tyranny they had experienced under British rule. During the Vietnam War many in Congress perceived the executive branch as over-reaching, and in response they passed the War Powers Resolution of 1973, which was an attempt to place a procedural check on executive power. This Note examines changes in the technology and actors involved in modern warfare against the scope of the Resolution. The 2011 conflict in Libya is presented as a specific example to demonstrate that modern warfare has evolved outside the scope of the Resolution. Based on the assumption that war powers should be balanced between the executive and legislative branches, this Note argues for new war powers legislation that is more broad and flexible in scope to accommodate the evolution of war.
BCLR Releases Vol. LV No. 3
The Boston College Law Review is pleased to publish the May 2014 issue. Here are summaries of this issue’s Articles and Notes: […]
Volume LVI Board of Editors Announced
We are pleased to announce the Board of Editors for the 2014-2015 academic year: Volume 56 Board of Editors […]
BCLR Releases Vol. LV No. 2
The Boston College Law Review is pleased to publish the March 2014 issue. Here are summaries of this issue’s Articles and […]