Abstract: The Federal Sentencing Guidelines provide for special treatment of hard-core cartel activity to ensure that penalties for antitrust crimes effectively deter and punish criminals. The U.S. Supreme Court’s transformational sentencing cases, however, have returned significant discretion to sentencing judges, including the discretion to vary from the Guidelines on policy grounds. Yet, judicial discretion in sentencing is not unlimited. Judges are required by statute to impose sentences that are “sufficient, but not greater than necessary” to achieve the goals of sentencing, subject to appellate review for reasonableness. This Note analyzes whether there is a sustainable basis for judicial policy disagreement with the Antitrust Guideline’s use of a proxy to measure economic harm. It proposes that appeals courts apply a sliding scale framework when reviewing policy-based variances, and argues that judicial discretion may, in some instances, promote the goals of white-collar sentencing, including moral condemnation. Finally, this Note concludes that judicial discretion to vary from the Antitrust Guideline’s harm proxy, appropriately cabined by appellate review, would not undermine antitrust sentencing policy.
BCLR Releases Vol. LIV No. 2
Boston College Law Review is pleased to announce the publication of our March 2013 issue. • Jeremy Waldron, Separation of […]
BCLR Elects New Board of Editors
On March 22, 2013, the membership of the Boston College Law Review elected a new Board of Editors for the […]
BCLR Editors Win Student Writing Competitions
Two members of the Boston College Law Review‘s Executive Board, Laura Kaplan and Michael Palmisciano, recently won national writing competitions […]