When the Securities and Exchange Commission initiates court action against a public company for violation of federal securities laws, it often proposes a court-enforced settlement between the parties known as a “consent judgment.” Nearly all SEC consent judgment proposals contain a “no-admit” clause, whereby the defendant explicitly refuses to confess to the allegations asserted in the SEC’s complaint. Although “no-admit” consent judgments avoid the costs and uncertainties associated with prolonged litigation, they might not be effective in deterring future misconduct, and they could conceal the full truth about the defendant’s wrongdoing. In the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, courts have increasingly questioned whether the SEC’s “no-admit” consent judgment proposals adequately promote the public interest. Despite the courts’ concerns, however, the SEC—and not the courts—is in the best position to assess whether its consent judgment proposals promote the public interest and to implement suitable changes. Accordingly, to ensure that consent judgment proposals do in fact promote the public interest, the SEC should reevaluate its current settlement practices and make appropriate adjustments.
2015-2016 Board of Editors
We are pleased to announce the Board of Editors for the 2015-2015 academic year.
BCLR Latest Issue: Vol. LVI No. 3
The Boston College Law Review is pleased to announce our latest publication , the May 2015 issue. The current issue is featured on […]
BCLR Releases Vol. LV No. 3
The Boston College Law Review is pleased to publish the May 2014 issue. Here are summaries of this issue’s Articles and Notes: […]