When the Securities and Exchange Commission initiates court action against a public company for violation of federal securities laws, it often proposes a court-enforced settlement between the parties known as a “consent judgment.” Nearly all SEC consent judgment proposals contain a “no-admit” clause, whereby the defendant explicitly refuses to confess to the allegations asserted in the SEC’s complaint. Although “no-admit” consent judgments avoid the costs and uncertainties associated with prolonged litigation, they might not be effective in deterring future misconduct, and they could conceal the full truth about the defendant’s wrongdoing. In the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, courts have increasingly questioned whether the SEC’s “no-admit” consent judgment proposals adequately promote the public interest. Despite the courts’ concerns, however, the SEC—and not the courts—is in the best position to assess whether its consent judgment proposals promote the public interest and to implement suitable changes. Accordingly, to ensure that consent judgment proposals do in fact promote the public interest, the SEC should reevaluate its current settlement practices and make appropriate adjustments.
BCLR Releases Vol. LIV No. 2
Boston College Law Review is pleased to announce the publication of our March 2013 issue. • Jeremy Waldron, Separation of […]
BCLR Elects New Board of Editors
On March 22, 2013, the membership of the Boston College Law Review elected a new Board of Editors for the […]
BCLR Editors Win Student Writing Competitions
Two members of the Boston College Law Review‘s Executive Board, Laura Kaplan and Michael Palmisciano, recently won national writing competitions […]